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et al.: Evidence

EVIDENCE
I. RES

GESTAE EXCEPTION CLARIFIED AND FEDERAL RULE ON
HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY ADOPTED

In Bain v. Self Memorial Hospital1 and Doe v. Asbury,2 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals examined and rearticulated the
scope of the res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay.
Both cases hold that in order to be admissible under the res gestae exception, a statement must be spontaneous and contemporaneous with the event at issue. In Bain the court also indicated
that South Carolina will follow the federal rule and admit several layers of hearsay if each layer is admissible under a recognized hearsay exception. 3
Mrs. Bain was admitted to Self Memorial Hospital and remained there until her death a week later. 4 Hospital records indicate that she was often disoriented and repeatedly tried to
climb out of bed. She died prior to the arrival of Dr. Allred, who
subsequently informed her husband of her death.5 Mrs. Bain's
executor brought a wrongful death suit against the hospital and
offered into evidence a pretrial deposition of Mr. Bain, who died
prior to trial. In his deposition Mr. Bain stated that Dr. Allred
told him that Mrs. Bain had "crawled out of the bed . . . and
the jolt from the fall bursted her heart."6 The trial judge excluded this as hearsay and granted a nonsuit in favor of the hospital. Mrs. Bain's executor appealed. 7
The court of appeals acknowledged that both Mr. Bain's
statements in his deposition and his report of what Dr. Allred
said to him were hearsay since both were out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.8 Finding

1. 281 S.C. 138, 314 S.E.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. 281 S.C. 191, 314 S.E.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1984).

3. 281 S.C. at 145, 314 S.E.2d at 608.
4. Id. at 141, 314 S.E.2d at 605.

5. Id. at 143, 314 S.E.2d at 606.
6. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 144, 314 S.E.2d at 607.
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no South Carolina authority on the issue of hearsay within hearsay, the court adopted the federal rule that hearsay within hearsay is not excluded if each portion falls within a recognized hearsay exception.9
The court concluded that the first hearsay segment - Mr.
Bain's deposition statement - was admissible under the hearsay
exception allowing previous testimony on a controlling issue if it
was subject to cross-examination and the witness is unavailable
at trial.10 After extensive consideration of the second hearsay
segment - Mr. Bain's recollection of Dr. Allred's statement to
him - the court concluded that it was admissible under the res
gestae exception.
The court indicated that there is no fixed time period during which statements made are absolutely admissible under the
res gestae exception. Instead, the court stressed that a statement, to be admissible as res gestae, must satisfy several criteria. First, it must be "substantially contemporaneous" with the
event in issue; second, it must be a "spontaneous" utterance;
third, it must have been made while under the "immediate influences" of the event; and, fourth, it must not have been made as
a result of reflection or as a self-serving declaration. 1 The rationale of the res gestae exception is that in some instances an
out-of-court statement provides safeguards equivalent to those
present in court, 12 and in those cases an absolute prohibition
against hearsay would serve no useful purpose.
The court determined that because Dr. Allred's statement
was made "in the midst of the circumstances surrounding [Mrs.
Bain's death]," it was substantially contemporaneous with her
death.1 3 The court further concluded that the statement was
made "spontaneously and instinctively while he was under the
immediate influence of this event. ' 14 Finally, the court noted

9. Id. at 145, 314 S.E.2d at 608. FED. R. EvID. 805 provides that "hearsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules."
10. 281 S.C. at 145, 314 S.E.2d at 608.
11. Id. at 146, 314 S.E.2d at 608.
12. Id. at 147, 314 S.E.2d at 608.
13. Id. at 147, 314 S.E.2d at 609. The court noted that Dr. Allred made the statement immediately after he arrived at the scene and no more than twenty minutes after
Mrs. Bain's death.
14. Id.
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that the statement was not self-serving. 15 Thus, the evidence was
admissible under the res gestae exception.
In Doe v. Asbury a truck driven by Asbury collided with a
car driven by Doe. Doe claimed she had been in the median preparing to make a left turn when Asbury's truck ran head on into
her car; Asbury asserted that Doe turned in front of his truck
and caused the collision. After the accident, while she was being
administered first aid, Doe told a policeman that she had been
"parked in the median and the truck hit her in the median.' 16
The trial court admitted the policeman's testimony regarding
Doe's statement, and the jury returned a verdict for Doe. 17 Asbury appealed.
The court stated that each assertion of the res gestae exception must be decided on its own facts, with much discretion left
to the trial judge.-" The court then held that the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the statement was sufficiently contemporaneous with the accident to qualify for admission under the res gestae exception. 9 The court indicated that
such statements are not made inadmissible merely because, as
here, they are self-serving; rather, the self-serving character may
be considered as a factor in determining the spontaneity of the
20
statement.
With its decisions in Bain and Doe, the court of appeals has
indicated that it will continue the South Carolina Supreme
Court's flexible, fact oriented approach to the res gestae exception. These two cases make it clear that in order for a statement
to be admissible under the exception, the statement must be
spontaneous, substantially contemporaneous with the event,
made under the immediate influences of the event, and uttered
under circumstances precluding any reflection or self-serving intent. The court also indicated that South Carolina will follow

15. Id.
16. Id. at 194, 314 S.E.2d at 851.
17. Id. at 197, 314 S.E.2d at 852.
18. Id., 314 S.E.2d at 852-53.
19. Id., 314 S.E.2d at 853.
20. Id.
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the federal rule regarding double and triple layers of hearsay.
Judith L. McInnis

II.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE LIMITED

In Masters v. Rodgers Development Group2 ' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that recitations in a deed filed in
accordance with the state recording system did not constitute
indisputable matter subject to judicial notice by an appellate
court after entry of a default judgment. This decision indicates a
limitation on the courts' use of judicial notice that was not apparent in prior decisions.
In September 1977 Masters contracted with Rodgers Development Group to install plumbing on property owned by Rodgers. Rodgers conveyed the property to Stevenson and filed the
deed on October 13, 1977. Masters completed work on the property, but Rodgers refused to pay the balance due. Masters then
filed notice of a mechanic's lien on the property and commenced
a foreclosure action. 22 Stevenson failed to file responsive pleadings, and a default judgment was entered against him. After the
judgment Stevenson moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the property sold to satisfy the lien. Stevenson appealed from the order
of sale.23
The court of appeals stated that the default did not prevent
24
Stevenson from challenging the sufficiency of the complaint,
but affirmed the foreclosure order. Foreclosure could have been
avoided only if the facts pleaded in the complaint, and, thus,

21. 283 S.C. 251, 321 S.E.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1984).
22. Id. at 253, 321 S.E.2d at 195.
23. Id. at 252-53, 321 S.E.2d at 195.
24. Id. at 254, 321 S.E.2d at 196. The court stated: "'A party seeking a default
judgment is entitled to only such relief as is framed by his pleading ....
It follows that
if a complaint fails to state a cause of action, the rendering of a default judgment
thereon is without authority of law and therefore reversible error.'" Id. (quoting Mutual
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. McKenzie, 274 S.C. 630, 632, 266 S.E.2d 423, 424 (1980)). The court
further noted that an objection based on a complaint's failure to state a cause of action is

not waived by default. Id. (citing Gadsden v. Home Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 89 S.C. 483,
72 S.E. 15 (1911)).
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admitted by Stevenson upon default, were sufficient to show
that Stevenson took title without notice of the mechanic's lien
and gave valuable consideration. 25 The court stated that nothing

on the face of the complaint showed that Stevenson purchased
for value from Rodgers and that the circuit court was correct in
denying Stevenson's motion to dismiss. 26 The court refused to
take judicial notice of the deed conveying the property, which
Stevenson claimed would show the requisite valuable consideration Since judicial notice takes the place of proof, a matter
subject to judicial notice must be so notorious that the court can
assume its existence without proof.28 The court stated that a judicially noticed fact must be either so common that it is accepted by the public without qualification or so accurate that it
is capable of ready verification. 9
Judicial notice after a default judgment is even more strictly
limited. The court stated that prior authority suggested that after default notice can be taken only of "indisputable" matters.
The recitals in the deed did not conclusively establish Stevenson
as a purchaser for value.30 Further, the court observed that appellate courts, limited to review of the record, are generally reluctant to notice adjudicative facts even when those facts may
be absolutely reliable. Otherwise, the adverse party would be denied the opportunity to contest the noticed matters. 1 Consequently, the court held that "original judicial notice of adjudicative facts at the appellate level should be limited to matters
3' 2
which are indisputable.

This opinion restricts the use of judicial notice further than
prior decisions have done. In earlier cases South Carolina courts
have indicated that the recording act was judicially noticed, 33
that courts were required to take judicial notice of public laws
and statutes,34 and that courts could take judicial notice of their
25. The requirements for priority of a mechanic's lien against a subsequent pur-

chaser for value are contained in S.C. CoDE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976).
26. 283 S.C. at 254-55, 321 S.E.2d 194.
27. Id. at 256, 321 S.E.2d at 197.
28. Id. at 255, 321 S.E.2d at 196 (citations omitted).
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 256-57, 321 S.E.2d at 197.
31. Id. at 256, 321 S.E.2d at 197.
32. Id.
33. Green v. Rock Hill, 149 S.C. 234, 147 S.E. 346 (1929).
34. Robert Trent Jones, Inc. v. B-F Limited Partnership, 276 S.C. 469, 279 S.E.2d
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own records, files, and proceedings.3 5 More recently, however,
the South Carolina Supreme Court began to adopt a more restrictive view, imposing a "specificity" requirement on facts subject to judicial notice. 6
The court's holding in Masters is contrary to the majority
view that judicial notice may be taken of state acts and records,
including recorded deeds. 37 It is possible, however, under a narrow reading of the court's holding, that this restriction on judicial notice will apply only to situations in which judicial notice is
requested at the appellate level after a default judgment has
been entered.
Judith L. McInnis

613 (1981). Two earlier cases, however, indicated a distrust of the recording system. In
Burke v. Burke, 141 S.C. 1, 139 S.E. 209 (1965) and Williams v. Lawrence, 194 S.C. 1, 8
S.E.2d 838 (1940), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the recording of a mortgage established only a prima facie case for its validity, which could be rebutted when
inconsistent circumstances were established.
35. Freeman v. McBee, 280 S.C. 490, 313 S.E.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1984).
36. In Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 321 S.E.2d 258
(1984), a party requested that the circuit court take judicial notice that related cases
were pending or had recently been tried. The supreme court responded: "Counsel should
make clear at the trial level and at the appellate level what facts are to be judicially
noticed and should refer the court to the evidence supporting its position, particularly
when counsel requests the courts (trial and appellate) to consider facts in another appeal." Id. at 81 n.1, 321 S.E.2d at 266 n.1.
37. 32B Am. JUR. 2D Federal Rules of Evidence § 55 n.95 (1982)(citing Hay v. U.S.,
461 F.Supp. 1168 (D. Cal. 1978)).
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